A new legal baseline
On 23 July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a unanimous advisory opinion on the obligations of States in respect of climate change — the first time the United Nations' (UN) principal judicial organ has examined the international legal framework applicable to the climate system. The ICJ rejected the argument, advanced by several major emitters that the climate treaties operate as a self-contained regime displacing other rules. Instead, it read the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement alongside customary international law, the law of the sea and international human rights law, holding that States owe a due diligence obligation to prevent significant harm to the climate system.
Two findings matter commercially more than the rest. First, the ICJ held that a State's failure to take appropriate action — including through fossil fuel production and consumption, the granting of exploration licenses or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies — may amount to an internationally wrongful act attributable to that State. Secondly, breach triggers the ordinary consequences of State responsibility, including cessation and, in principle, reparation to injured States.
The opinion did not arrive in isolation. International Court of Law of the Sea (ITLOS) reached parallel conclusions on greenhouse gases as marine pollution in 2024; the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held in Klima Seniorinnen judgement that inadequate climate action can violate the European Convention on Human Rights; and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) went further in 2025, holding that due diligence duties extend to companies and that States must require enterprises to reduce emissions and disclose value-chain emissions.
These international court judgments show that a coherent judicial consensus formed with unusual speed.
Why an opinion addressed to States reaches boardrooms
Advisory opinions do not bind companies, states or other actors of international law. However, they reach them through four transmission mechanisms, each already operating.
Regulation: The ICJ opinion was explicit that States must regulate public and private operators within their jurisdiction, with effective enforcement. Governments that under-regulate now face a characterization of that inaction as unlawful. The rational board response is to price in tightening, not loosening.
Asset viability: According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) NetZero by 2050 report, the number of countries announcing pledges to achieve net zero emissions over the coming decades continues to grow. But the pledges by governments to date – even if fully achieved – fall well short of what is required to bring global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions to net zero by 2050. In legal practice, where licensing and subsidy are themselves flagged as potentially wrongful, the legal foundation of certain revenue streams becomes less secure. As a result, as long as states pledged to achieve the net zero pledges of states, they are expected to impose stricter controls and more legal obligations on investors.
Standard of care: The Grantham Research Institute of the London School of Economics finds that at least half of decisions in corporate framework cases now cite cases brought against governments. In other words, domestic courts borrow the concepts and rules of the international courts.
Directors' duties: Once regulation and litigation are foreseeable, failure to assess them becomes a governance question — assessed under ordinary care and diligence standards in ordinary board minutes.
Litigation is maturing, not receding
These statistics indicate that the perspective on climate change as a legal matter is shifting. Climate-washing claims remain the most common corporate case type, but new filings are slowing as claimants move toward "total inaction" cases targeting companies with no credible plan at all. Financial institutions are now inside the perimeter, with Milieudefensie v ING case testing whether financed emissions attract the same duty of care.
The near-misses were instructive. In Lliuya v RWE case, the Hamm court in Germany dismissed a Peruvian farmer's claim in May 2025 for want of a sufficiently concrete risk to his property — but accepted that a single emitter could in principle bear proportionate liability, and that the consequences of emissions were foreseeable to a major energy producer decades ago. In Milieudefensie v Shell, the Hague Court of Appeal quashed the 45% reduction order while confirming that Shell owes an obligation to counter dangerous climate change; the case is now before the Dutch Supreme Court, with judgment expected around January 2027. Neither claimant obtained a remedy. Both left behind reasoning the next claimant would use.
From duty of care to duty of vigilance: the TotalEnergies breakthrough
That reasoning has now produced an order. On 25 June 2026, in NAAT and others v TotalEnergies (TotalEnergies Judgment), the Paris Judicial Court ordered the company to update its vigilance plan within six months to address climate risks arising from its Scope 3 emissions — the combustion of the oil and gas it sells, roughly 90% of its carbon footprint — and to adopt and effectively implement measures that are "reasonable, concrete and consistent" to mitigate those risks. The Court declined to prescribe specific measures under the French Duty of Vigilance Law, but retained judicial oversight of implementation, and reserved the claims brought under the Ecological Damage Law — including a requested emissions reduction order and a ban on new oil and gas projects — pending review of the revised plan.
What separates this from Shell is the remedy. There the duty was affirmed and the reduction order set aside, leaving the claimants with a principle and nothing to enforce. Here the Court also declined to dictate what TotalEnergies must do — but it ordered the company to produce a plan measured against a standard the Court itself defined, and kept the file open to verify that it does. An obligation of result, supervised, is a different thing from a declaration.
Two findings set that standard, and both narrow the company's options. The first is the benchmark. The Court refused to treat vigilance as something the company could calibrate for itself, interpreting the statutory duty by reference to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, which require alignment with internationally agreed temperature goals. The revised plan will therefore be assessed against 1.5°C, not against TotalEnergies' own targets. The second is causation. The Court found a very strong causal link between extraction and downstream combustion: hydrocarbons that are extracted are, on any realistic view, eventually burned, and the remaining carbon budget depleted accordingly. That reasoning is what anchors the Scope 3 obligation described above — it forecloses the argument that emissions from products sold are someone else's responsibility.
Read alongside the same court's earlier greenwashing decision, which found the company's new field developments irreconcilable with its own carbon-neutrality claims, the practical consequence is concrete: a plan that leaves sales volumes untouched is unlikely to satisfy a court that has already held both that 1.5°C is the yardstick and that extraction drives combustion. The next hearing is listed for 21 January 2027.
For companies with no French footprint, the most consequential passage is elsewhere. This is the first judicial interpretation of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, and the Court held that climate change constitutes an adverse environmental impact within the due diligence framework of Articles 7 to 16—despite the Omnibus I package deleting the former Article 22, the climate transition plan obligation. That directly rebuts the defense, already deployed in the Dutch proceedings, that removing Article 22 extinguished any duty to mitigate emissions. The Belgian court hearing Falys v TotalEnergies has adjourned specifically to take the French judgment into account.
The European counter-current
Against this, the EU moved the other way on disclosure decisively. Directive (EU) 2026/470 — Omnibus I — was published on 26 February 2026 and entered into force on 18 March 2026, cutting considerably deeper than the Commission's original proposal.
Under the amended Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), obligations apply broadly to undertakings with over 1,000 employees and €450 million in net turnover; small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and financial holding undertakings fall out of scope; sector-specific standards are dropped. Non-EU groups are captured where EU turnover exceeds €450 million and at least one subsidiary or branch exceeds €200 million. Transposition is due by 19 March 2027. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) is narrowed to companies with above 5,000 employees and €1.5 billion in turnover, with compliance pushed from July 2027 to July 2029. Both instruments include review clauses that allow the scope to be extended again.
Carbon pricing, by contrast, moved in the opposite direction. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive regime on 1 January 2026. The mechanism works by making importers pay, at the EU border, the carbon price that EU producers pay inside the emissions trading system. An importer of covered goods — cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, hydrogen and electricity — must first calculate the emissions embedded in each consignment, then buy CBAM certificates covering that quantity, and finally hand those certificates back to the authorities once a year in a number matching the previous year's imports. That final step, the surrender, is where the cost actually crystallises; everything before it is measurement and purchase.
The calendar follows from that structure. Importers above a 50-tonne annual threshold — a de minimis that exempts most small importers while still capturing the overwhelming majority of embedded emissions — must submit verified annual declarations. Certificate sales open on 1 February 2027, and the first surrender falls due by 30 September 2027 in respect of 2026 imports, priced against quarterly EU auction averages. Any carbon price already paid in the country of production is deducted, so the border charge falls only on the unpriced remainder. Free allocation to CBAM sectors phases out across 2026–2034, and the importer's exposure rises in step as it does.
The obligation is legally the importer's; commercially it lands on the non-EU producer that must supply verified product-level data. A supplier that cannot produce it will find the importer applying default values — which are deliberately conservative, and therefore expensive.
The lesson is not that Europe has deregulated, but that the disclosure perimeter narrowed while the pricing and liability perimeters widened — and that, in the TotalEnergies Judgement as French court has now held, narrowing the statute did not narrow the underlying duty.
The multilateral and national layers
COP30 in Belém (November 2025) produced the Global Mutirão decision, a tripling of adaptation finance by 2035 and the Belém Mission to 1.5. Despite support from more than 80 countries, it did not produce a fossil fuel transition roadmap; the final text does not mention fossil fuels at all. Unilateral trade measures — read: CBAM — were among the most contested items and will remain so.
For Turkish business the national layer is now concrete. Turkish Climate Law no. 7552 entered into force on 9 July 2025, establishing the Turkish Emissions Trading System. The 2026–2027 pilot covers installations in CBAM-exposed sectors — cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertiliser — emitting above 50,000 tCO₂e annually, with 100% free allocation and no financial liability during the pilot. The logic is commercial: carbon priced domestically is carbon not paid at the EU border.
What this means in practice?
- Treat the vigilance plan as a litigated document, not a compliance formality: After TotalEnergies, Scope 3 assessment and concrete mitigation measures are the minimum, and courts will supervise implementation.
- Do not read Omnibus I as relief from duty: The scope of reporting narrowed; the standard of care did not.
- Map CBAM exposure through the supply chain, not just at customs entry: Verified product-level emissions data is now a condition of market access, and the contractual burden of producing it should be allocated expressly.
- Watch the future cases: The Dutch Supreme Court in Mileudefensie v. Shell and Milieudefensie v ING case and the Belgian Falys case will each move the standard before any legislature does.
Conclusion
The compliance perimeter has narrowed and the liability perimeter has widened. International law now supplies both the vocabulary and the evidentiary architecture that domestic courts are using to convert climate responsibility into specific corporate obligation — and, since June 2026, into enforceable orders. Reading the EU's simplification package as permission to stand down would be shortsighted.