The Competition Board (“Board”) examined the request for the withdrawal/revocation of its decision authorizing the acquisition of sole control of the company controlled by Mubadala Investment Company PJSC (“Mubadala”), Getir Araç Dijital Ulaşım Çözümleri Ticaret AŞ (“Getir Araç”), by Tiktak Yeni Nesil Ulaşım Çözümleri ve Araç Kiralama AŞ (“Tiktak”), filed by Getir’s founder Mehmed Nazım Salur (“Applicant”) under Article 11 of Administrative Judicial Procedure Law No. 2577 (“IYUK”), and unanimously decided to reject the request¹.

What Had Happened?

Within the scope of the restructuring of Getir, an agreement was signed on 15.06.2024 between Mubadala, Getir B.V. and the Applicant. The Board authorized this transaction on 19.09.2024². Under the said restructuring, the majority and the control of the grocery and food business lines, which constitute Getir's main areas of activity, were left to Mubadala; whereas the majority shares in and the control of Getir Araç, Getir Teknolojik Hizmetler AŞ (“Getir Finans”), Getiriş Danışmanlık ve Ticaret AŞ (“Getir İş”) and Bitaksi Mobil Teknoloji AŞ (“BiTaksi”) remained with Mehmed Nazım Salur.

According to the Applicant, by a letter dated 30.12.2024 Mubadala notified that it had withdrawn from this allocation arrangement and announced that the minority shares in the said affiliates would be "reduced to zero" and transferred into Mubadala's ownership. Thereupon, the Applicant brought actions for a declaration of non-existence (yokluk davası) against the relevant companies in respect of the general assembly meetings held within Getir Perakende, Getir İş, Getir Finans and Getir Araç between 31.01.2025 and 11.06.2025 concerning the removal of the founders from management; and further initiated proceedings before the Netherlands courts concerning the transfer of Getir BV's shares in Getir Perakende to Mubadala³.

While this process was ongoing, the Board, by its decision dated 18.09.2025, authorized the acquisition of sole control of Getir Araç by Tiktak. Thereupon, the Applicant, by way of the application it filed with the Authority, requested the withdrawal or revocation of the said merger authorization pursuant to Article 11 of the IYUK.

What Did the Applicant Claim?

The Applicant firstly argued that the Competition Board’s finding that Getir Araç was under the sole control of Mubadala and its clearance of the transfer of Getir Araç to Tiktak effectively legitimised the ongoing contractual dispute between the applicant and Mubadala concerning the invalidity of Mubadala’s transfer of control over Getir Araç, violated the rights and interests arising from the applicant’s status as founder, and would render ineffective the legal proceedings initiated by the applicant against Mubadala in Türkiye and the Netherlands, which could also determine the control structure over Getir Araç.

Second, the applicant argued that the Board had incorrectly defined the relevant product market. According to the applicant, the market should have been narrowly defined as “hourly and minute-based car rental (car-sharing)” and this service should not have been assessed within the same market as taxi services or traditional short-term car rental services. The applicant claimed that, if such a market definition were adopted, Getir Araç and Tiktak would hold a joint dominant position and the transaction would significantly impede competition.

How Did the Board Assess?

With respect to the first allegation, the Board stated that the application made to the Authority pursuant to Article 11 of the IYUK essentially arose from the contractual dispute between the applicant and Mubadala. The Board emphasised that the Competition Authority’s mandate does not extend to assessing private-law relationships between the parties or disputes arising from such relationships, and that the merger control review is limited to the competition law effects of the notified transaction. Accordingly, the Board concluded that the allegations concerning contractual disputes did not require a reassessment of the clearance decision issued by the Board following its merger control analysis.

With respect to the relevant product market, the Board noted that short-term car rental services constitute a market that has been rapidly developing and transforming alongside technological developments. The Board found that there were insufficient grounds to consider hourly and minute-based rental services as entirely separate from traditional car rental services and therefore determined that the parties’ activities could be assessed within the market for “short-term car rental.” In addition, taking into account the presence of numerous strong competitors operating in the market and the dynamic nature of the sector, the Board concluded that the transaction was not of a nature that would significantly impede competition or create a dominant position.

In conclusion, the Board held that the grounds put forward by the applicant did not require the previously granted clearance decision to be withdrawn, revoked or amended pursuant to Article 11 of the IYUK.

The Board unanimously authorized the transaction concerning the establishment of joint control by Bain Capital Investors, LLC (“Bain”) and Kohlberg & Co., L.L.C. (“Kohlberg”) over KPCI Holdings Limited (“KPCI”)⁴.

The transaction envisaged that KPCI, which operates at global level in the fields of clinical research, commercial packaging and contract development and manufacturing of ready-to-use medicines (CDMO), would come under the joint control of Bain and Kohlberg. The Board, while assessing whether the transaction had the nature of an acquisition within the scope of Communiqué Concerning the Mergers and Acquisitions Calling for the Authorization of the Competition Board No. 2010/4 (“Communiqué no. 2010/4”) examined the existence of joint control and whether KPCI had the nature of a full-function undertaking.

As regards joint control, the Board determined that, although the board of directors of KPCI takes its decisions by simple majority, the approval of at least one Bain member and one Kohlberg member, excluding the independent members, is required, and that strategic matters, primarily such as the annual business plan and the approval of the budget, are made subject to the decision of the board of directors. In this framework, it was assessed that the decisive influence over strategic decisions is exercised jointly by Bain and Kohlberg.

The Board also assessed whether the rights granted to one of the other shareholders, Mubadala Investment Company PJSC (“MIC”), gave rise to a finding of joint control. Although the quorum for the board of directors’ meetings as a rule requires the participation of one MIC member, it was concluded that this right does not afford MIC the possibility of permanently blocking decisions, since, in the event that the MIC member does not attend, the meeting is postponed by five business days and the presence of MIC is not required at the meeting to be held again. As for the “Reserved Matters” which require the prior written approval of Bain, Kohlberg and MIC at the general assembly, these were characterized as mere investment-protection mechanisms; whereas it was assessed that they do not cover matters that are strategic or that confer control authority.

Another assessment that stands out in the decision relates to the appointment of the CEO. MIC's approval is required only during the first eighteen months following the closing, with respect to the removal of the current CEO and/or the appointment of a new one in his place; after this period, the other two shareholder groups may appoint the CEO without MIC's approval as well. The Board concluded that this approval right, which is limited in terms of duration and confined to a single matter, does not confer upon MIC control authority over KPCI and, also taking into account that the chairman of the board of directors does not have a second or casting vote, did not change its assessment that the decisive influence is concentrated solely in Bain and Kohlberg.

As regards full functionality, the Board, pointing out that KPCI is an existing undertaking already in operation, emphasized that, in line with the Guidelines on Cases Considered As a Merger or an Acquisition and the Concept of Control and settled case law, the establishment of joint control over an existing undertaking in operation constitutes a concentration without the full functionality criterion being separately sought, and ruled that the transaction is subject to authorization since the turnover thresholds are exceeded.

In the substantive review, it was determined that there is no horizontally or vertically affected market between the parties' activities in Türkiye. Although there is a global overlap in the CDMO field between STADA and Arxada, which are under Bain's control, and KPCI, it was assessed that there is no horizontal overlap in Türkiye, since STADA and Arxada operate in the field of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API), whereas KPCI operates in the field of finished dosage products (FDP). For this reason, it was concluded that the transaction would not create a dominant position and would not give rise to a risk of coordination between the parties to the joint venture, and the transaction was unanimously authorized without any condition or commitment being sought.

The Board unanimously authorized the transaction concerning the acquisition of sole control of Caba Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ (“Caba Çimento”) and its subsidiaries, through Salentijn Properties 1 B.V. (“Salentijn”), ultimately by Titan Cement International S.A. (“TCI”)⁵.

The transaction envisaged the acquisition of sole control of Caba Çimento and its subsidiaries, which are solely controlled by the Balyen Family, ultimately by TCI through Salentijn Properties 1 B.V. Within the scope of the acquisition, TRAÇİM, which produces clinker and cement in the Marmara Region, and AGT Gıda, which is engaged in rail freight transportation activities, would also join the TCI group. TCI, on the other hand, operated predominantly in and around Tekirdağ through its subsidiary Titan Çimento Beton San. ve Tic. AŞ ("Titan Çimento", formerly known as Adoçim Marmara), which produces grey cement and pozzolan. The Board determined the product markets affected by the transaction as grey cement, clinker, pozzolan and cement transportation by rail. As regards the geographic market, due to the regional nature of cement, it first created areas with radii of 250 km and 150 km, taking the parties' facilities as the centre; it then applied the “10% Criterion Method” which it had developed itself. As a result of this analysis, it was determined that the provinces in which the consumption coverage ratio of TRAÇİM, the subject of the transfer, exceeded 10% were İstanbul, Tekirdağ and Kırklareli, that there was no province exceeding this ratio for the acquirer Titan Çimento; and that, therefore, the parties' sales did not overlap in any province. Accordingly, the relevant geographic market was determined as İstanbul, Tekirdağ and Kırklareli for grey cement; “the Marmara Region and its surroundings” for clinker; and Türkiye as a whole for pozzolan and cement transportation by rail. The Board also assessed that there is a horizontal overlap between the parties in the grey cement market; and a vertical overlap arising from an upstream-downstream market relationship in the clinker, pozzolan and cement transportation by rail markets.

Horizontal Effects

As regards horizontal effects, the Board stated that, under the 10% Criterion Method, the parties' sales did not overlap on the basis of the same province; that the shares of the merged undertaking remained limited; and that a large number of strong competitors continued their activities in the market. The Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions provide that, where the combined share remains below 20%, no competitive concern shall be presumed, and in the province of İstanbul, in which the sales are concentrated, the combined share remained below this threshold.

In Tekirdağ, on the other hand, while the market share of the merged undertaking exceeded 20%, the HHI value increased by 541 points, rising from approximately 2,296 before the transaction to approximately 2,838 after the transaction. Nevertheless, the Board, assessing together the existence of strong competitors such as AKÇANSA, ÇİMENTAŞ and LİMAK, the widespread idle capacity in the sector (including more than one third of the production capacity of the merged undertaking), the ability of customers to change suppliers at low cost, the short-term nature of the contracts, and the fact that no opinions revealing competitive concerns were received from customers and competitors in the market research, concluded that the transaction would not significantly weaken effective competition.

In the clinker market, on the other hand, no horizontal overlap was determined, since the acquirer had no production/sales activity as of the notification date and almost all of TRAÇİM's clinker was intended for internal consumption.

Vertical Effects

As regards vertical overlaps, the Board took as basis the 25% threshold in the Guidelines on the Assessment of non-Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions. It was stated that, in all three vertical relationships, the shares of the merged undertaking remained below this threshold; that the upstream market sales were limited, that the relevant markets have many players and that no risk of customer or input foreclosure arises, and accordingly that no competitive concern was found in terms of the vertical relationships either.

The Board granted conditional clearance, subject to certain commitments, to the transaction whereby Borusan Tedarik Zinciri Çözümleri ve Teknoloji AŞ (“Borusan Tedarik”), operating in the logistics and supply chain sector, would be acquired by CEVA Corporate Services (“CEVA”), which is controlled by CMA CGM S.A⁶.

As a result of its assessment, the Board determined that the transaction gave rise to competitive concerns that could lead to a significant impediment to effective competition in the market. Within the framework of these competitive concerns, CEVA offered the commitments set out below. Having assessed that these commitments were suitable to eliminate the competition issues caused by the transaction, could be fulfilled within a short period of time, and could be implemented effectively, the Board granted clearance to the acquisition:

Commitments to Preserve Existing Agreements

• Agreements entered into with existing customers shall remain in force, following the completion of the transaction, for one year under the same terms and conditions⁷.
• Price increases shall not exceed the limits stipulated in the existing agreements.

Commitments Regarding Customer Switching and Termination Rights

• Customers wishing to switch service providers shall, upon request and provided that they notify CEVA in writing before 31 December 2025 that they have entered into an agreement with another service provider, be provided with services throughout a 12-month transition period. In addition, for customers whose agreements expire by 31 December 2025, a 12-month transition period service shall also be provided.
• During the transition period, services shall continue to be provided under the existing contractual terms, existing software integrations shall be maintained, and data migration shall be facilitated.
• A termination right of at least 3 months’ prior notice will be added to the existing agreements and to new agreements to be entered into within one year following the completion of the transaction; where this right is exercised, transition period services will be provided.
• Existing customer agreements shall be amended accordingly, and evidence of such amendments shall be submitted to the Turkish Competition Authority within 120 days following the completion of the transaction.

Commitments Regarding Access for Competitors and the Prevention of Foreclosure in the Market

• Competing companies shall, upon request, be granted access to the distribution network on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and prices.
• For a period of 2 years, customers will not be required to purchase different logistics services jointly.

Transparency and Monitoring

• The commitments will be announced to both customers and the public following the completion of the transaction
• An independent trustee shall be appointed within 30 days following the completion of the transaction, the trustee will monitor the implementation of the commitments for 2 years and prepare compliance reports at 6-month intervals.

The Turkish Competition Board found that Ay Sanat Prodüksiyon ve Yapım AŞ (“Ay Yapım”) and Med Yapım Televizyon ve Filmcilik AŞ (“Med Yapım”) infringed Article 4 of the Law No. 4054 by mutually exchanging current and competitively sensitive information regarding employee salaries and salary increase rates⁸. Following the settlement procedure, the Board concluded the investigation in respect of Ay Yapım and Med Yapım by imposing administrative monetary fines reduced by 25%.

What Happened?

The case initially arose within the framework of competition concerns in the TV series production and distribution sector. One aspect of the investigation concerned competition issues stemming from the joint international distribution of Turkish TV series through MA Distribution Televizyon ve Filmcilik AŞ (“Madd”), a joint venture established by Ay Yapım and Med Yapım. This part of the investigation was resolved through the structural and behavioural commitments offered by the parties⁹.

During the same investigation, however, the Board also established that the two production companies had exchanged competitively sensitive information relating to the labour market. This aspect of the case was partially resolved through the settlement procedure and the imposition of administrative fines. Accordingly, the decision provides an example of how different competition concerns identified within the same investigation may be addressed through different procedural mechanisms.

How Did the Board Assess the Case?

In its assessment of the labour market aspect, the Board found that information concerning employee salaries and salary increase rates in the TV production sector constitutes competitively sensitive information under competition law. The Board noted that, in a sector involving numerous specialised categories of labour—including screenwriters, actors, technical staff and management personnel—human resources constitute an important competitive parameter. Accordingly, the exchange of current information regarding employee costs between competing production companies was considered capable of weakening the undertakings’ independent decision-making processes and distorting the competitive determination of wages.

The decisive evidence relied upon by the Board consisted of a single WhatsApp exchange obtained during the on-site inspection. The Board considered that even this single exchange amounted to the sharing of current and strategic information directly relating to competitive parameters, namely the salary increase rates to be applied to employees.

In their defence, the parties argued that:

• the exchange occurred only once;
• it concerned only a single employee shared by the parties;
• salary increases actually granted to other employees differed from those referred to in the correspondence;
• they had cooperated closely with the case handlers by offering substantial commitments regarding their joint distribution activities;
• as a mitigating factor, a significant portion of their revenues was generated from international sales; and
• should a fine be imposed, it should be calculated on the basis of labour-market-related turnover rather than total turnover.

The Board rejected all of these arguments and decided that the administrative fines should be calculated on the basis of the undertakings’ total turnover.

The Broader Context of the Case

The decision is significant in demonstrating the Competition Board’s approach to competition law enforcement in labour markets within the creative industries. While the competition concerns relating to the parties' joint distribution activities were resolved through commitments, the labour market issues were addressed through settlement and administrative fines, illustrating the Board’s use of different enforcement tools depending on the nature of the infringement.

Likewise, in its recent announcement¹⁰ concerning the casting agency and talent management sector, the Competition Board imposed administrative monetary fines on numerous undertakings due to agency commission rates, service conditions and the exchange of competitively sensitive information. In addition, in order to ensure effective competition in the market, the following obligations were introduced:

• casting direction and casting agency/talent management activities may not be carried out within the same economic entity;
• undertakings simultaneously conducting such activities must remove one of those activities from their articles of association and discontinue it in practice;
• production and casting agency/talent management activities may not be carried out together;
• casting agencies and talent managers may not perform any activities on behalf of producers in productions for which they supply talent;
• undertakings conducting both activities must discontinue one of them by removing it from their articles of association; and
• the participation of one performer in a production may not be made conditional upon the participation of other performers.

This demonstrates that, within the audiovisual production ecosystem, not only content distribution arrangements and commercial agreements, but also coordination concerning labour and service conditions, are subject to intensive competition law scrutiny.

The Board concluded that the steps taken by Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”) to relaunch Threads in Türkiye are consistent with the commitments previously accepted by the Board¹¹. Accordingly, the way has been cleared for Threads to become available again in Türkiye.

The process began with competition concerns arising from the integration of Threads with Instagram and the combination of data between the two services. During the investigation, interim measures were imposed requiring Meta to suspend data combination practices. In response, Meta suspended Threads’ operations in Türkiye, thereby rendering the interim measures devoid of purpose. For the period preceding the suspension of its operations, Meta was also subjected to an administrative monetary fine for failing to comply with the interim measure decision¹².

As part of the investigation, Meta offered a number of commitments aimed at addressing the identified competition concerns. Under these commitments, users will be able to access Threads independently of their Instagram accounts. Accordingly, users will be given the option either to continue using Threads through their Instagram accounts or to create a separate Threads account using only their mobile phone number, independent of Instagram. Where users choose to create an independent Threads account, personal data obtained from Instagram will not be combined with Threads.

The Board concluded that Meta’s plan to relaunch Threads in Türkiye is compatible with these commitments.

The Turkish Competition Board concluded its investigation into subscription-based video streaming platforms by accepting the commitments offered by Netflix¹³, Blutv¹⁴, Disney¹⁵, Amazon¹⁶, Exxen¹⁷ and Gain¹⁸. The investigation demonstrates that competition concerns relating to content exclusivity and talent exclusivity in digital broadcasting are now being examined more closely.

The investigation focused, on the one hand, on the risk of discrimination in Netflix’s dealings with independent producers seeking access to the platform and on the contractual conditions applied to them, and, on the other hand, on exclusivity provisions concerning content and creative talent adopted by the other platforms.

What is the scope of the commitments?

The commitments offered by Netflix contained more detailed provisions regarding the selection process for independent producers and content projects. These included:

• providing opportunities for production companies that had not previously worked with Netflix;
• organizing pitching events enabling direct engagement with new producers, directors and screenwriters;
• increasing the transparency of application criteria; and
• ensuring that applications are concluded within a specified period together with a reasoned response.

With respect to content exclusivity, Netflix committed to:

• shortening the exclusivity periods applicable to both branded and non-branded Turkish content;
• introducing revenue-sharing models during specified periods; and
• limiting music rights to the relevant exclusivity periods.

With respect to talent exclusivity, Netflix committed to:

• refraining from imposing exclusivity on creative professionals such as actors, directors and screenwriters;
• exercising due care regarding the scope and duration of exclusivity provisions in agreements concluded with producers;
• reflecting rules separating the roles of producer, casting director and talent manager in the production process; and
• refraining from broad exclusivity arrangements with Turkish producers or distributors that could have non-compete effects or extend to all content.

The commitments offered by the other platforms broadly followed the same approach. They undertook to limit the duration of exclusivity periods applicable to branded and non-branded content, shorten such periods through revenue-sharing or cost-reimbursement mechanisms under certain circumstances, refrain from arrangements that could directly or indirectly create exclusivity over creative talent for branded Turkish content to be broadcast in Türkiye, and avoid broad exclusivity arrangements with producers or distributors covering all content.

The Board concluded that these commitments were capable of eliminating the competition concerns identified during the investigation and therefore terminated the investigation. The decision demonstrates that competition law scrutiny in digital broadcasting is no longer limited to market power between platforms. The selection of producers, access to creative labour, talent mobility and the subsequent exploitation rights relating to content have also become central elements of competition law enforcement.

On 11 June, the Criminal Court of Peace, upon the request of the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, ordered the appointment of a supervisory trustee over certain companies¹⁹ operating in the white meat sector²⁰.

In its decision, the Criminal Court of Peace found that there was strong suspicion of criminal conduct arising from the exchange of competitively sensitive information, the coordination of pricing behaviour outside normal market conditions, and the implementation of supply and sales policies to the detriment of consumers. The court further considered that there was strong suspicion that the assets derived from these alleged activities had been laundered and, on that basis, appointed the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) as supervisory trustee.

Although the decision does not constitute a final finding of an infringement of competition law, it provides an example of an interim protective measure adopted within the framework of an ongoing criminal investigation. The case demonstrates that allegations of competition law infringements may give rise not only to administrative sanctions but also, within the context of criminal investigations, to measures capable of affecting the management of companies.

The Board’s recent decisions concerning undertakings operating in the food sector and holding strong market positions demonstrate the importance of refrigerators, freezers and display stands at points of sale for competitors’ market access and product visibility. The Board considered that filling such equipment exclusively with the products of a single undertaking may make it more difficult for competing products to reach consumers, particularly at smaller points of sale where display space is limited.

Against this background, the Board has introduced obligations requiring a certain portion of such point-of-sale equipment to be made available to competing products in response to similar competition concerns across different product markets. The decisions provide for the allocation of 30–35% of the relevant space to competing products, together with obligations that the allocated space be visible, kept as a single block in certain circumstances, and clearly labelled. The scope and implementation of these obligations nevertheless differ across the decisions. The following sections examine how this approach has been implemented in practice and the specific obligations imposed in each case:

Unilever/Magnum Decision: Behavioural Remedy Reshaped Through an Interim Measure

The Board initiated an investigation against Unilever Sanayi ve Ticaret Türk AŞ (“Unilever”) and Magnum Dondurma AŞ (“Magnum”) on suspicion that the Law had been violated and previously imposed obligations had not been complied with²¹. Within the scope of this investigation, the Board decided to impose a comprehensive interim measure aimed at ensuring that space is allocated to rival products in freezers at points of sale.

What Happened?

In its earlier 2021 decision (“2021 Decision”)²², the Board determined that Unilever held a dominant position in the industrial ice cream market, the impulse ice cream market, and the take-home ice cream market, and found that it had abused its dominant position through its discount practices. The Board also concluded that Unilever had restricted competition through certain contractual arrangements and practices, in particular the non-compete obligation contained in its agreement with Getir Perakende Lojistik A.Ş. (“Getir”).

In that framework, the Board imposed an obligation requiring that, at points of sale with a closed net sales area of 100 m² or less, where there is no other ice cream freezer directly accessible to consumers apart from the freezer belonging to Unilever, 30% of the visible part of Unilever’s freezer and 30% of the total freezer volume at the point of sale be opened to rival products.

Following the 2021 Decision, the Board conducted a sector inquiry in order to examine whether this obligation had been effectively implemented in practice and to assess the competitive conditions in the market. Within the scope of that inquiry, information was collected from competitors, field inspections were conducted, and the transfer of Unilever’s ice cream business to Magnum was also taken into account.

How Did the Board Assess the Matter?

The Board concluded that the actual market picture showed that the competitive structure envisaged in the 2021 Decision had not materialised. In its field study, the Board found that rival products were absent from the relevant freezers at 85.7% of sales points where an Algida freezer was present.

The Board considered that this outcome could not be explained solely by the preferences of the points of sale. Rather, it assessed that rivals’ access to the freezers may have been hindered by commercial incentives, advantages, de facto interventions, or actual practices relating to freezer use.

The Board also underlined that certain competitors had weakened in the market, that some players had even exited the market, and that visibility of products in freezers is critical importance for competition, particularly in smaller retail outlets. For that reason, the Board decided to impose an interim measure in order to prevent serious and irreparable harm pending the final decision and to preserve the competitive market structure.

Pursuant to the decision, following measures must be implemented within one month from the notification of the reasoned decision:

• 30% Block Space Allocation Obligation: At points of sale with a closed sales area of 100 m² or less, if there is no other freezer accessible to consumers apart from Unilever’s ice cream freezer, 30% of the total volume of each freezer, in the form of a single block, must be allocated to rival products.
• Labelling Obligation: The space allocated to rival products must be marked with a label stating: “This part is allocated to competing products.”
• Empty-Space Obligation: Where no rival products are present, the relevant 30% space must be left empty, and Magnum products must not be placed in that area.
• Limited Increase Option Upon Request: If requested by the point of sale, the space allocated to rival products may be increased up to 50%.

Coca-Cola’s Commitments Were Accepted

The Competition Board concluded its investigation into Coca-Cola Satış ve Dağıtım AŞ (“CCSD”) by accepting the commitments offered by the company²³. The case shows that the Board continues to closely monitor practices at points of sale, particularly commercial arrangements capable of creating de facto exclusivity effects.

What happened?

The investigation focused primarily on concerns regarding exclusivity practices and exclusionary effects created through discount schemes under Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition.

What is the scope of the commitments?

The Board’s main focus was whether the practices made it more difficult for competitors to access points of sale and increased dependence on a single brand.

Accordingly, the cooler-access rule introduced in 2021 was expanded, and it was accepted that 35% of certain coolers in both the traditional trade channel and the on-premise consumption channel would be opened to competing products. The commitments require this space to be vertically separated within the cooler, clearly marked as allocated to competing products, and supported by additional information provided to sales outlets. They also provide that, where multiple coolers are present at a sales point, the access ratio will be applied on a per-cooler basis, compliance will be monitored through independent third-party measurement reports, and no materials reducing the visibility of competing products may be used in the allocated section.

In addition, the efficiency conditions used for cooler allocation and the related completion invoice system were abolished. Changes were also made to the premium and target system, reducing the impact of variable remuneration for certain sales roles and discontinuing certain financial support and performance reporting practices on the dealer side. Furthermore, the conditions for product support granted as investment support to sales outlets were revised and discount policies were updated.

It was decided that these commitments would be reviewed again after three years.

Interim Measures Imposed on Haribo: 30% of the Space Allocated to Competing Products!

Within the framework of the investigation conducted against Haribo Şekerleme San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. (“Haribo”), which is active in the soft candy market, the Board decided that an interim measure should be imposed in order to prevent competition infringements in the market and any irrevocable harm these may cause²⁴. Pursuant to the decision, 30% of the visible side of the Haribo stands located in all traditional outlets with an area of 200 square meters or less was required to be allocated to competing products.

What Had Happened?

The Board launched an investigation on 5 March 2026 to determine if Haribo violated the Law in response to the allegations that it prevented competition in the relevant market by abusing its dominant position in the soft candy market, excluded its competitors through conduct and behavior that lead to de facto exclusivity, and intervened in the resale prices of outlets²⁵. While the investigation was ongoing, the Board decided that an interim measure should be imposed in order to protect competition in the soft candy market and prevent any irrevocable harm.

What Interim Measure Did the Board Impose?

The Board imposed the following obligations in relation to all Haribo stands located in traditional outlets with an area of 200 square meters or less, to be implemented within one month following the notification of the reasoned decision concerning the imposition of the interim measures and to remain in effect until the issuance of the final decision:

• 30% Space Allocation Obligation: It was ruled that a space corresponding to 30% of the volume of the Haribo stands must be allocated to competing brand products which do not have soft candy stands at the relevant outlet.
• Single Block and Visible Area Requirement: It was stipulated that the space allocated to competing products must be placed on the visible side of the stand, on the vertical plane and in a single block.
• Labelling Obligation: It was stated that the space allocated to competing products must be clearly identified with a label including the phrase “This space is allocated to competing products.”
• Implementation and Certification Obligation: It was ruled that Haribo must start implementing the interim measure within one month following the notification of the reasoned decision and certify before the Turkish Competition Authority that it has fulfilled these obligations.

Board conditionally authorized the acquisition by Cargill Tarım ve Gıda Sanayi Ticaret AŞ (“Cargill Türkiye”) of the sole control over PNS Pendik Nişasta Sanayi AŞ (“PNS”) within the framework of the behavioral commitments submitted by the parties²⁶.

What Did the Board Assess?

The Board assessed that, as a result of the transaction, effective competition in the downstream market for “glucose syrup and its mixtures” might be significantly restricted and that this might lead to increases in the prices of raw materials and final products. However, concluding that the commitments submitted by Cargill Türkiye are sufficient, appropriate and proportional to eliminate the identified competitive concerns, the Board conditionally authorized the transaction.

Which Commitments Were Accepted?

The commitments accepted by the Board focused on three basic competition concerns:

• Pricing Behavior: Price increases for products subject to quotas at domestic points of sale shall be restricted to specific cost elements, and the price and cost data shall be capable of being monitored by the Authority through independent sworn-in certified public accountant reports for a period of five years. In addition, extraordinary price adjustments shall be notified to the Authority and, where necessary, such increases may be withdrawn by the Board.
• Risk of Supply Restriction: In order to ensure the supply of products to customers, arbitrary practices in the termination of contracts shall be avoided and objective criteria shall be complied with in spot sales. In addition, the Authority shall be notified in case of supply disruption under extraordinary economic conditions, and the decision in question may be withdrawn by the Board.
• Risk of Cross Subsidization: A commitment was given that the revenue generated from the sale of glucose syrup and its mixtures shall not be used to finance other product groups.

The Board emphasized that the commitments constituting the basis of the authorization decision are binding. It was stated that, in case of a violation of these obligations, administrative fines accruing on a daily basis may be imposed pursuant to Article 17 of Law.

Board rejected the request of Artı Bilgisayar Satış ve Eğitim Hizmetleri İnşaat Makine Sanayi AŞ (“TROY”) for the revocation, amendment or adoption of a new decision concerning the Board’s previous decision²⁷ regarding its active cooperation application, pursuant to Article 11 of the Administrative Procedure Law No. 2577 (“APL”)²⁸. The Board concluded that TROY’s active cooperation application did not meet the conditions for full immunity; however, its previous assessment regarding the reduction of the administrative monetary fine to be applied provided that the necessary conditions are fulfilled remained valid.

What Had Happened?

Based on the findings obtained during the preliminary inquiries conducted against Apple and various undertakings, the Board obtained findings indicating that TROY and Gürgençler Bilişim İletişim İç ve Dış Ticaret AŞ (“Gürgençler”) had an understanding regarding negative matching, in other words, an agreement not to place advertisements on Google using each other’s brands and certain keywords. Following these findings, TROY submitted an active cooperation application to the Authority and requested that its application be assessed within the scope of full immunity and that no administrative monetary fine be imposed. However, in its decision dated 3 July 2025, the Board accepted the application within the scope of a reduction in the administrative monetary fine, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions.

Following this decision, TROY argued that it had submitted its active cooperation application before the preliminary inquiry was initiated and claimed that it should therefore be granted full immunity. Accordingly, TROY requested the Board to reconsider its previous decision pursuant to Article 11 of the APL.

What Did the Board Assess?

The Board noted that, on the date of TROY’s application, a preliminary inquiry was ongoing against TROY and that an on-site inspection had been conducted at TROY within this scope²⁹. Although the findings forming the subject matter of the application had been obtained within the scope of a different file, the Board concluded that, since the findings had been obtained within the scope of the ongoing preliminary inquiry conducted against TROY, the application did not meet the condition required for full immunity, namely that “the application must be submitted before the Board decides to conduct a preliminary inquiry.”

The Board also assessed that TROY’s application did not provide additional information and documents capable of changing or expanding the parties to the infringement and that it provided only limited information regarding the duration of the infringement. Accordingly, the Board concluded that the conditions required for granting TROY full immunity were not met; however, the active cooperation application remained valid for the purposes of a reduction in the administrative monetary fine, provided that the necessary conditions are fulfilled.

A World Trade Organization (“WTO”) panel has largely sided with China in its challenge to Türkiye’s tariffs and import controls on electric and hybrid vehicles. In a report circulated on 28 July 2026, the panel found that additional duties on electric vehicles and certain hybrids exceeded Türkiye’s WTO tariff commitments, while the import permit regime placed Chinese vehicles at a competitive disadvantage to domestically produced models. The findings bear out the concern raised in our Second Quarter 2024 article, “Türkiye to Impose Additional Duties on Chinese Passenger Cars”, which concluded shortly after the duties were announced that their compliance with Türkiye’s WTO obligations was “doubtful”.

The decision covers the amended tariff regime introduced in September 2025, which broadened the measures beyond China to vehicles from countries without a regional trade agreement with Türkiye. Under that regime, electric vehicles face an additional duty of 30 per cent or $8,500 per vehicle, whichever is higher. Plug-in hybrids are subject to 30 per cent or $7,000, while combustion-engine vehicles and non-plug-in hybrids face 25 per cent or $6,000. These charges are imposed on top of Türkiye’s ordinary 10 per cent tariff.

The panel’s findings were nevertheless more nuanced than a wholesale rejection of the regime. It held that the duties on electric vehicles and certain hybrid tariff lines exceeded the maximum rates Türkiye had committed to at the WTO. China did not, however, establish the same breach for combustion-engine vehicles, and the panel found that duties on some hybrid classifications remained within Türkiye’s commitments. Türkiye also failed to justify the excess duties as measures protecting health or conserving natural resources. Its exemptions for regional trade agreement partners were generally accepted, although the exemption granted to Venezuela was not.

The panel separately rejected Türkiye’s import permit regime for electric and externally rechargeable hybrid vehicles from countries outside the EU and Türkiye’s free trade agreement network. Importers must, among other conditions, establish 20 authorised service stations across seven regions, employ specifically certified technicians, operate a Turkish call centre with at least 40 staff for each brand, appoint a locally resident representative and provide undertakings concerning battery inspections. The panel concluded that each requirement, as well as their enforcement through import permits, treated imported vehicles less favourably than comparable Turkish vehicles. Türkiye did not demonstrate that the differences were necessary to enforce its consumer protection or vehicle-approval rules.

The report does not itself alter the duties or licensing conditions, and it remains subject to WTO adoption and possible appeal. If the findings stand, Türkiye will be expected to bring the measures into compliance, potentially through changes to tariff levels and less restrictive, origin-neutral after-sales requirements. Chinese manufacturers and Turkish importers should therefore continue to price on the basis of the existing regime, while monitoring possible amendments that could materially change landed costs and market-entry models. More broadly, the ruling signals that industrial and consumer-protection policies may remain legitimate, but their design must not exceed tariff commitments or impose heavier market-access burdens on imported vehicles.

Russia has escalated its challenge to the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (“CBAM”), requesting that the World Trade Organization establish a panel to examine the scheme and parts of the EU Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”). The EU objected when Russia’s first request was considered on 24 July 2026, meaning that no panel has yet been established. Russia may renew the request at a subsequent meeting, at which point panel establishment would ordinarily be automatic under WTO rules.

The challenge comes as CBAM moves from reporting to financial liability. Since 1 January 2026, EU importers bringing in more than a certain amount of covered products must generally be authorised CBAM declarants. They must report the emissions embedded in those imports and surrender certificates priced by reference to EU ETS allowances.

In its consultation request, Russia objected to origin-based derogations and to the authorisation, emissions-reporting and verification, and certificate purchase, maintenance and surrender requirements. Its subsequent panel request formulated more specific claims concerning differences in CBAM liability resulting from country-specific default values and the recognition of carbon prices paid in third countries. Russia principally characterises CBAM as a border measure inconsistent with the GATT rules on tariff commitments and import restrictions. In the alternative, it argues that CBAM subjects imported goods to internal charges and regulatory requirements exceeding, or less favourable than, those applied to like EU goods.

The case also reaches beyond CBAM itself. Russia alleges that the EU’s allocation of free ETS allowances to sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage constitutes a prohibited export subsidy, because exposure to trade with third countries—including the value of exports—forms part of the eligibility calculation. The EU rejects the broader characterisation of its climate regime as protectionist, maintaining that CBAM is designed to apply an equivalent carbon cost to domestic and imported goods and to prevent production from moving to countries with less stringent climate policies. If a panel is established, the dispute is therefore likely to test whether CBAM’s detailed design achieves that equivalence or imposes additional disadvantages on foreign producers.

Russia’s challenge does not suspend CBAM or relieve businesses of their existing obligations. Turkish producers and their EU customers should continue collecting verifiable emissions data, reviewing contractual responsibility for CBAM costs and preparing for the first certificate surrender deadline. Any WTO ruling is likely to be years away and could face further procedural uncertainty because the WTO Appellate Body remains inoperative and Russia does not participate in the interim appeal arrangement. The dispute could nevertheless shape the future treatment of foreign carbon prices, default emissions values, country exemptions and administrative requirements, with consequences extending well beyond Russian exports.

EU trade with the US continued to weaken in early 2026 as the effects of US tariffs and earlier front-loading reshaped transatlantic trade flows. According to Eurostat, EU exports to the US fell by 26.4% year-on-year in February, following a 27.8% decline in January, contributing to a sharp contraction in the EU’s trade surplus. These figures, however, are affected by the unusually high comparison base of early 2025, when exporters accelerated shipments ahead of tariffs introduced from March 2025.

Looking beyond this distortion, the fourth quarter of 2025 provides a more representative indication of the tariff impact. EU exports to the US were around 15% lower year-on-year in that quarter, with iron and steel exports down nearly 40% and chemicals declining by 60–80%, although both sectors had benefited from substantial front-loading earlier in the year. The euro’s appreciation against the dollar also weighed on European exporters.

The impact has varied across sectors. EU automotive producers benefited from a reduction in the applicable US tariff from 25% to 15%, yet automotive exports remained 22% lower. By contrast, exports of aluminium and copper products increased despite facing 50% tariffs, reflecting specific supply constraints in the US market. Shipbuilding was a notable outlier, supported by major cruise ship deliveries and long-term order books.

Economists caution that the full effects of the tariffs may take several years to materialise. Commerzbank estimates that US tariff measures will reduce euro-area gross domestic product by approximately 0.3% in 2026, while additional tariffs on patented pharmaceuticals could create further pressure. At the same time, stronger EU exports to destinations outside the US indicate that some trade diversion is already taking place.

Source

On 14 May 2026, the Russian Federation notified the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Committee on Safeguards of the initiation, on 7 May 2026, of a safeguard investigation into imports of certain motor car pneumatic tyres into the customs territory of the Eurasian Economic Union (“EAEU”). The investigation is being conducted by the Department for Internal Market Defence of the Eurasian Economic Commission under the EAEU’s trade defence framework.

The investigation seeks to determine whether increased imports of the products concerned have caused, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry. Interested parties may seek participant status within 25 days of initiation, request access to the non-confidential case file and participate in public hearings. Requests for public hearings may be submitted within 45 days, while written comments in Russian may be filed within 60 days of initiation.

If the investigation results in an affirmative determination, the EAEU may impose temporary safeguard measures restricting imports of the products concerned in accordance with its applicable trade defence rules and WTO requirements.

Source

Global merchandise trade performed better than expected in the first quarter of 2026, supported by strong demand for artificial intelligence (“AI”)-related products despite emerging geopolitical disruptions in the Middle East. According to estimates by the WTO and the United Nations Trade and Development, the volume of global merchandise trade increased by 1.9% quarter-on-quarter and 3.2% year-on-year, exceeding the WTO’s full-year growth forecast of 1.9%.

Growth was primarily driven by AI-related electronic components, with the US-dollar value of trade in AI-enabling goods rising by more than 40% year-on-year. Asia remained the main engine of global trade, recording year-on-year growth in seasonally adjusted export and import growth of 12.9% and 14.6%, respectively, largely reflecting strong intra-regional trade in AI-related products. In contrast, Europe’s export volumes declined by 2.6%, mainly due to the exceptionally high level of gold and pharmaceutical exports recorded in early 2025 ahead of anticipated tariff increases, while North American imports fell by 10.7% compared with the same period last year.

Although the conflict in the Middle East began only toward the end of the quarter, it had already started to affect regional trade. Export and import volumes in the region declined by 9.7% and 11.9% year-on-year, respectively. WTO estimates based on available reporting countries indicate that, disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz also weighed on trade in crude oil, liquefied natural gas and fertilizers, with the full effects expected to become more visible in second-quarter data.

In value terms, office and telecommunications equipment posted the strongest growth, increasing by 44% year-on-year, followed by ores and minerals (+27%) and machinery (+9%). Meanwhile, chemicals, iron and steel, and fuels recorded modest declines. Overall, the first quarter demonstrated the resilience of global trade, with robust AI-related investment largely offsetting the initial effects of geopolitical tensions, although downside risks remain for the remainder of 2026.

Source

Dumping and Subvention – New Investigations/ Reviews

Safeguard Measures – New Investigations

Measures Adopted