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Turkish Competition Authority Approves Migros Acquisitions in Bilecik

The Turkish Competition Authority ("TCA") approved an application by Migros¹, one of the largest supermarket chains in Türkiye, to acquire the control over four stores owned by Erfa AVM², a local market chain in Bilecik, in Bilecik province through the transfer of fixed assets and leasehold rights, as well as one store through the transfer of fixed assets and the establishment of a new lease agreement.



¹ Migros Ticaret AŞ

² Elbin Gıda İnşaat Tekstil Hayvancılık Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Şirketi

Turkish Competition Authority Approves Migros Acquisitions in Bilecik

The Competition Board ("Board") treated Migros's acquisitions over the past three years in the same relevant product market as one single transaction in its turnover calculation, allowing the company to exceed the required turnover thresholds. The current transaction was subsequently approved, despite Erfa's turnover being below the thresholds stipulated in the Communiqué No. 2010/4 on Mergers and Acquisitions Requiring the Approval of the Competition Board ("Communiqué No. 2010/4"). Of note in the legal assessment, referred to as the "8(5) rule" within Turkish competition law practise, this exceptional rule was introduced to keep control over anti-competitive concentrations in a specific market. This rule applies to transactions between the same parties or within the same relevant product market that have been recently consummated and do not individually exceed the notification thresholds, thus not requiring the Board's approval. Given its relatively exceptional nature and its creation of a broader oversight scope compared to the corresponding EU regime, this decision is considered significant for reminding the 8(5) rule.

In terms of the merits, the Board applied its usual approach in defining the relevant geographic market during its assessment, considering both the size of the store involved in the transaction and the driving distance between competing stores. This method is commonly used in the European Union and is frequently applied in its decisions regarding fast-moving consumer goods ("FMCG") retailers. Ultimately, the Board concluded that the transaction would not create competitive concerns and granted approval for the acquisition.

Competition Board Finds No Evidence of Violations by Jet Fuel Suppliers

The Board concluded its formal investigation into Petrofis³, THY Opet⁴, and Triple Star.⁵ and found no evidence of competition law violations.

Based on a 2018 complaint, the Board conducted a preliminary investigation into Petrofis, THY Opet, and Triple Star but decided not to initiate a formal investigation (“**Preliminary Investigation Decision**”). However, the Ankara Regional Administrative Court annulled the Preliminary Investigation Decision citing inadequate examination, thus forcing the Board to launch a comprehensive investigation.



³ Petrofis Akaryakıt Dağıtım Hizmetleri AŞ

⁴ THY Opet Havacılık Yakıtları AŞ

⁵ Triple Star Aviation Ltd.

Competition Board Finds No Evidence of Violations by Jet Fuel Suppliers

- Petrofis holds a dominant position in the jet fuel supply market,
- Petrofis abused this dominant position by discriminating among intermediaries in jet fuel sales by offering discriminatory prices to players engaged in jet fuel sales,
- Petrofis, THY Opet, and Triple Star engaged in an anti-competitive agreement aimed at excluding competitors, especially the Complainant, from the jet fuel sales intermediation market.

As the impacts of applying different prices to different undertakings and the concrete allegations of the Complainant regarding were not adequately investigated in the initial process, the Regional Administrative Court canceled the Preliminary Investigation Decision. Following a detailed assessment, the Board concluded:

- Consistent with the European Union's recent approach, each airport was defined as a separate geographic market, and Petrofis was found to hold a dominant position in 13 out of 18 airports subject to the investigation,,
- The Complainant and Triple Star were not in equivalent positions due to significant differences in their purchase volumes, therefore, the sole fact that Petrofis offers different prices to these two undertakings does not amount to a discrimination by Petrofis,
- While the alleged discriminatory behavior could constitute a refusal to supply violation, the specific conditions for abuse such as elimination of competition in submarket and probable consumer harm were not present in this case,
- The alleged coordinated actions and/or agreements among Petrofis, Triple Star, and THY Opet were found not to stem from an express or implied agreement but to stem from the unique economic market structure,
- Therefore, Petrofis, Triple Star, and THY Opet were not engaged in anti-competitive coordinated actions/agreements.

Mavili Elektronik Fined, Authorized Service Providers Cleared

The Board concluded its investigation into Mavili Elektronik⁶ and its authorized service providers on April 13, 2023, ending a four-year investigation into allegations of competition-related violations.

Kare⁷ filed a complaint with the Board in 2020, alleging that Mavili Elektronik abused its dominant market position by directing Kare to its authorized service provider, Filiz⁸ (, and interfering in pricing based on buyers.



⁶ Mavili Elektronik Tic. ve San. AŞ

⁷ Kare Yangın Otomasyon Sis. San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.

⁸ Filiz Güvenlik Sistemleri Proje ve Sanayi Ticaret AŞ

Mavili Elektronik Fined, Authorized Service Providers Cleared

The Board initially determined that no violation had taken place, however, the Ankara Regional Administrative Court issued an annulment regarding that decision, requiring the Board to reopen its investigation into Mavili Elektronik on allegations of resale price maintenance, customer and regional restrictions, and customer allocation.

During the investigation, the Board found that Mavili Elektronik:

- Sent price lists to its authorized service providers,
- Issued instructions regarding discount rates,
- Required approval for quotes to be provided by authorized service providers,
- Imposed sanctions on authorized service providers that did not comply with the instructions,
- Revised contracts to include penalties for authorized service providers that deviated from the instructions and pricing policy.

Furthermore, the Board initiated a separate investigation into Filiz and Yıldız⁹ concerning allegations of customer allocation. It determined the undertakings did not engage in a customer-allocation agreement; instead, Mavili Elektronik allocated customers to them.

The investigation into Mavili Elektronik was resolved in a settlement, and the Board decided that no penalties would be imposed on Filiz and Yıldız.

Two Board members concurred with the decision regarding Mavili Elektronik but expressed dissenting opinions on the exclusion of its export figures from the turnover calculation based on the absence of a provision in the secondary legislation on the exclusion of foreign sales in calculating the fine amount. According to them, this approach would yield incorrect results by subtracting a gross value from a net value, therefore inaccurately reflecting the undertaking's economic power. In contrast, the Board has sometimes excluded revenues from export sales in penalty calculations, arguing they do not constitute turnover generated in Türkiye. Dissenting opinions highlight the need for a consistent approach to whether export revenues should be included in the turnover basis for administrative fines.

⁹ Yıldız Yangın Söndürme Sistemleri San. Tic. AŞ

Exemption Granted to the Artı +1 Project

The Board evaluated SEM , a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sabancı Holding, regarding its request for exemption for the +1 Project (“**Project**”) and the +1 Analysis and Consultancy Services Framework Agreement to be signed with potential customers.

¹⁰ SEM İnternet Reklam Hizmetleri ve Danışmanlık AŞ (“SEM”)

Exemption Granted to the Artı +1 Project

What is the +1 Project?

The Project aims to analyze consumer behavior using advanced data analytics and provide insights for marketing activities. Undertakings interested in participating in the Project submit their requests to SEM, then negotiate and sign a framework agreement. Under the Project, interested non-competing participants are informed about the theme which is determined based on demand and discuss datasets. Data is then collected from customers (with their consent) and from publicly-available sources. At the end of the Project, customized commercial or promotional insights are prepared and shared exclusively with each undertaking, after which the data is destroyed. Undertakings then use these insights to enhance their

Board's Assessments

The Board has examined the potential competition law risks of the Project based on data analytics under three main headings: (i) exclusivity, (ii) exchange of competitively sensitive information among competitors, and (iii) effects that enhance coordination among competitors.

The Board determined there are no competitive concerns regarding exclusivity, on the grounds that:

- Participants are not obliged to comply with SEM's insights,
- There is no element preventing undertakings from making decisions based on insights,
- Participants are not required to exclusively obtain SEM's services,
- Parties may contract with third parties.

Regarding exchange of competitively sensitive information, the Board stated that backward-looking, anonymized, encrypted, and non-continuous data would not restrict competition. However, due to the potential for undertakings in digital markets to become competitors quickly, and lingering concerns about information exchange between competitors, the

Exemption Granted to the Artı +1 Project

Despite all potential concerns related to coordination risk and information exchange between competitors , the Board considered:

- (i) the Project would reduce marketing and advertising costs, benefiting consumers;
- (ii) consumers would find the desired product more easily;
- (iii) efficiency would increase;
- (iv) high sales made with low marketing budgets would also benefit consumers.

The Board granted individual exemption to the Project for five years, requiring an independent auditor to monitor the presence of competitor undertakings in applications, data collection, and relationships between applications to alleviate concerns.

Competition Board Accepts OBİLET's Commitments

OBİLET¹¹ has submitted a final commitment statement to the Board to address concerns arising from applications that could lead to the exclusion of competitors in the ticketing software for the bus transportation (IMS), the distribution of bus service data to the platforms (B2B), and the sale of bus tickets through the platforms (B2C) . The commitment covers exclusionary actions against its competitors and online advertising and communication restrictions stipulated in agreements with competitors in the B2C market.



¹¹ Obilet Bilişim Sistemleri AŞ

Competition Board Accepts OBİLET's Commitments

OBİLET instituted a policy where it stopped ticket sales on its platform for bus companies using Mydata Bilişim Ltd. Şti.'s ("MYDATA") IMS, then resumed sales with higher commission rates. This was designed to encourage firms utilizing MYDATA's IMS to transition to OBİLET's software. The Board found that this practice effectively linked OBİLET's IMS and B2C services. According to its commitment statement, OBİLET drafted and executed a standard agreement exclusively for the use of B2C services by bus companies utilizing IMS other than OBİLET/BİLETALL's¹² IMS or switching to them subsequently. Additionally, separate standard agreements were regulated for both B2C and IMS services with varying pricing. This addressed the Board's concern that distinct pricing mitigated the perception of IMS services being provided at no cost. OBİLET clarified that the clauses in the standard agreement concerning the end of sales via OBİLET's platform for bus companies would be evaluated independently of IMS usage.

In the Board's evaluation, it was noted that OBİLET's imposition of an advertising ban on B2Cs using platforms such as Google Adwords could significantly restrict the online advertising channels of the companies concerned. Consequently, one of the commitments includes the removal of clauses from the contracts between OBİLET and B2Cs that would result in such an advertising ban.

OBİLET amended the contract provisions regarding communication restriction and exclusive purchasing.

OBİLET committed to notifying relevant companies within the scope of these commitments.

The Board decided that OBİLET's commitments presented within the file sufficiently address competitive issues considered in the scope. The Board also decided that the commitments presented in the final commitment statement should also be applied to BİLETALL under OBİLET's authority.

¹² OBİLET BİLETALL'ı devralmış ve bu iki şirket pazarda tek bir teşebbüs olarak faaliyet göstermiştir. Bu nedenle soruşturma OBİLET ve BİLETALL tek bir teşebbüs olarak kabul edilerek sürdürülmüştür.

Koyuncu Elektronik Issued Fine for Evidence Tampering

Koyuncu Elektronik officials claimed that the deleted emails were removed due to storage space issues or for email overload. They said the deleted emails generally consisted of promotional mail, shipment and training notifications, and business development notes. However, officials could not substantiate their claim that the deletion was a routine procedure.

Based on the Board's established jurisprudence, the disruption of any data (emails, WhatsApp correspondence, etc.) by an enterprise during on-site inspections, regardless of content, is considered tampering with evidence and is deemed to hinder the on-site inspection.

The Board subsequently imposed an administrative fine on Koyuncu Elektronik.

Final Examination Decisions for Two Acquisitions

While it is relatively rare for merger/acquisition transactions to be subject to final examination by the Board¹⁷, such cases indicate the need for a more in-depth examination regarding whether the transaction would create or strengthen a dominant market position, or significantly reduce effective competition. Particularly since the legal amendment in 2020, which introduced the prohibition criterion of "significant impediment to effective competition" in Turkish competition law practice, mirroring EU law, there has been an observed increase in the number of cases undergoing final review, especially concerning concentrations. Between 2014 and 2023, out of 1965 merger applications, final examination were conducted only for 23 of them and after the legislative change in 2020, 9 out of 991 transactions were taken into final review between 2020 and 2023.

Ultimately, enterprises do have an opportunity to submit commitments regarding the transaction during this phase.

¹⁷ Between 2014 and 2023, out of 1965 merger applications, final examination were conducted only for 23 of them.

Board Intervenes in Online Hub and Spoke Cartel

Buybox, which is the name given to the box containing expressions such as “Buy Now” and “Add to Cart” on online sales platforms, refers to the system that determines which seller’s product will be redirected when clicked.

With its Buybox system, Cosmed determine the products to be included in the system and the undertakings in the system can win Buybox by offering the products on the list at lower prices. The Board assessed that with the help of Buybox system;

- Bakım Kutusu, Evdeeczane and Farmakozmetika obtain competitively sensitive information about each other
- they intervene in each other’s prices through Cosmed.
- they are able to understand that a competitor undertaking has requested such intervention as they act in the same way.
- Cosmed continuously monitors the Buybox system and intervenes in prices in case of deviation.

In light of these findings, the Board conclude that a hub-and-spoke cartel has been formed, with Cosmed being the “hub” and the other undertakings on the retailer level being “spokes”, achieving horizontal coordination.

The Board also assessed that the provision in Cosmed’s agreements with retailers, which seeks for Cosmed’s approval for retailers to sell on online marketplaces and allows that the products can only be sold to end-users, constitutes internet sales and customer restriction.

Upon the undertakings’ settlement requests, the investigations were ended in relation to the violations of forming a hub-and-spoke cartel and Cosmed’s resale price maintenance, whereas the Board ended the investigation with a commitment regarding Cosmed’s internet sales restriction to its retailers.

Discussions on Export Revenue in Administrative Fine Calculations

The Board initiated an investigation into Balparmak on March 9, 2023 based on allegations of resale price maintenance and following similar investigations into other FMCG businesses.



²² Altıparmak Gıda San. ve Tic. A.Ş

Discussions on Export Revenue in Administrative Fine Calculations

During its investigation, the Board determined that Balparmak intervened in retailers' resale prices, setting minimum and maximum resale prices, ensuring retailers adjust their prices, coordinating price increases among retailers. Balparmak used different tactics to maintain prices, such as rejecting retailers' requests for discounts/promotions and withdrawing product supply. The Board also determined that such actions took place from 2017 until the investigation was initiated.

The Board determined that Balparmak had committed a competition violation and the case ended in a settlement on June 15, 2023. Two Board members provided dissenting opinions regarding the exclusion of export figures in the decision. Other members, however, highlighted that legislation, judicial decisions, and the Board's precedents did not include such figures and that such an approach was contrary *"based on the power of the undertaking in the market."*

Uludağ Investigation Ends in Settlement; Export Figures not Considered in Fine Calculation

The investigation revealed that Uludağ had monitored the retailers' sale prices, warning those selling below the desired price and ensuring that prices were raised to the communicated level. The Board also determined that Uludağ mandated discount rates and did not make deliveries to undertakings unless they adjusted their prices.

Retailers were complicit in the scheme, complaining to Uludağ about other retailers charging low prices and seeking Uludağ's approval to set prices. The Board concluded that Uludağ violated competition rules by maintaining resale prices and ended the investigation with a settlement.

Two Board members argued that Uludağ's export figures should have been included in the fine imposed on Uludağ. The members reiterated the reasons provided in the Mavili Elektronik decision in this edition of Competition & Trade Quarterly, stating there was nothing contrary in the legislation, judicial decisions and the Board's precedents suggesting otherwise and that export turnover should be included in the Uludağ's turnover, and therefore, in the calculation of the administrative fine..

Hot Topic in Digital Markets: Daily Administrative Fines - Part 1 - Google Decision

Google, in light of the measures introduced, presented new proposed measures to the Board aimed at eliminating disadvantageous conditions for competitors and ensuring effective competition in the local search services market. On March, 2024, the Board accepted Google's proposed measures. Following the implementation of these measures by Google on April, 2024, the Board determined that the measures were applied only to local search services and not to measures related to comparing accommodation prices. Consequently, starting from April 15, 2024, daily administrative fines were imposed on Google.

As of May 21, 2024, Google introduced measures to eliminate the competition violation affecting accommodation queries and the Board terminated the daily fines, which had reached TRY 482 million

Hot Topic in Digital Markets: Daily Administrative Fines - Part 2 - Meta Decision

The Board announced on May 6 and May 8, 2024 that the daily administrative fines imposed on Meta²⁵ in two different cases were terminated..



²⁵ Meta Platforms, Inc.

French High Schools Investigation Finalized

The investigation established that the French private education institutions had jointly determined the school registration fees and the elements constituting the school fees, and were not entitled to benefit from the individual exemption. For this reason the Board issue administrative fines to each institution separately.

The Board also determined that the institutions agreed on the salaries of Turkish teachers and for this reason could not benefit from the individual exemption for this behavior either. Due to this violation, the Board again imposed administrative fines on the institutions separately. With this decision, which sets an example for competition law practices in the labor market, it is once again demonstrated that violation decisions regarding the labor market may be issued in investigations initiated on different allegations.

An Investigation Initiated Against Apple During the Sector Inquiry into Mobile Ecosystems

The Board suspected that Apple restricted app developers from informing users about alternative payment channels within the app and decided it should examine whether consumers' access to better price options was being restricted.

Apple also imposed another restriction on app developers by requiring they use its payment system, In-App Purchase ("IAP"), for in-app purchases and charged a 30% commission on sales made through IAP. The Board determined it was necessary to examine whether these restrictions limited the freedom of application developers and whether the IAP payment system prevented competitors from entering the ecosystem.

The Board subsequently initiated an investigation into Apple for prohibiting the use of payment systems other than IAP in the App Store and subjecting mobile application developers to anti-steering provisions.

US Initiates Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations against Türkiye and China

On 20 June 2024, the United States International Trade Commission (“**Commission**”) launched a dumping and countervailing duty investigation (“**Investigations**”) into brake drums imported from Türkiye and China.

At the first stage, the Commission will determine whether there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the US is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the US is materially delayed due to the imports.

EU Extends Safeguard Measures Applicable To Iron and Steel Products

On 25 June 2024, the European Commission (“**Commission**”) extended safeguard measures applicable to iron and steel products until 30 June 2026.

The Commission relied on three factors to justify the extension:

- (i) High levels of overcapacity in the iron and steel industry,
- (ii) Trade measures imposed by third countries, and
- (iii) The decrease in demand in the EU.

The safeguard measure takes the form of a tariff-rate-quota, above which a 25% duty applies.

Turkish Companies Should Prepare for the EU's Deforestation Regulation

The European Union's ("EU") deforestation regulation ("**Regulation**") will go into effect as of 31 December 2024. In summary, EU-based companies trading in certain commodities like cattle, wood, soy, palm oil, rubber, cocoa and coffee, as well as certain by-products such as leather, chocolate, furniture, printed paper products and palm oil-based derivatives will have to prove that their goods did not originate in recently deforested land.

With 31 December 2024 approaching, compliance with the Regulation is becoming an urgent matter for many businesses. In this article, we will summarize the key obligations under the Regulation and the effects the Regulation might have on Turkish businesses.

Prohibited: No More Deforestation-Causing Products on or from the EU Market

The Regulation prohibits the commodities in scope being placed on the EU market or exported from the EU market unless they are:

- (i) Deforestation-free,
- (ii) Produced in accordance with the legislation of the country of production, and
- (iii) Covered by a due diligence statement.

Which Sectors Will Be Impacted The Most?

The below table shows the total value of the exports of the affected goods from Türkiye to the EU for the last 3 years in USD:²⁶

	2021	2022	2023
Cattle	61.627.858	61.097.626	54.733.142
Cacao	59.375.463	58.406.109	70.354.818
Coffee	4.397.910	4.769.362	5.711.972
Palm Oil	17.910.530	12.268.466	29.116.684
Rubber	1.520.941.451	1.592.230.522	1.644.053.263
Soy	8.220.341	5.237	3.799.934
Wood	981.438.039	1.221.722.297	1.327.947.303

Accordingly, the hardest-hit industries will seemingly be wood and rubber.

²⁶ Data sourced from: <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=62&locale=tr>

Conclusion

The Regulation is another ambitious step by the EU to align global supply chains with EU's rules. It may cause some industries to change their supply chains, or change their place or methods of production. Among the Turkish industries, the wood industry is likely to be hit the hardest but Turkish companies can prepare for the Regulation in advance. Communication with their European business partners is the key to achieving compliance.

